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Aesthetics since Kant has been haunted by a seemingly irretractable 
dualism. On the one hand. aesthetics designates the theory of sensib­
ility as the form of possible experience; on the other hand, it desig­
nates the theory of art as a rdlection on real experience. The first is 
the objective element of sensation. which is conditioned by the a priori 
Conns of space and time (the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' aCthe en"rique 
of Pure Reason); the second is the subjective element of sensation, 
which is expressed in the feeling of pleasure and pain (the 'Critique of 
Aesthetic Judgment' in the Critique of Judgment), Gilles Deleuze ar­
gues that these two aspects of the theory of sensation (aesthetics) can 
� reunited only at the price of a radical recasting of the transcenden­
tal project as form!Jlated by Kant, pushing it in the direction of what 
Schelling once called a 'superior empiricism': it is only when the 
conditions of experience in general become the genetic conditions of 
real experience that they can be reunited with the structures of works 
of an. In this case, the principles of sensation would at the same time 
Constitute the principles of composition of the work of art, and conver­
sely it would be the structure of the work of an that reveals these 
conditions. I In what follows, I would like to examine the means by 
�'hich Deleuze anempts to overcome this duality in aesthetics. follow­
mg this single thread through the network of his thought, even if in 
tracing this line we sacrifice a cenain amount of detail in favor of a 
c.cnain perspicuity. The first pan analyses Deleuze's theory of sensa­
tIon; the second, his attempt to connect this theory with the structures of the work of an. 
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1 The Theory of Sensation: 'The Being of the Sensible' 
J. J Beyond Recog'licion and Commorl Sense 
Deleuze frequently begins his discussions of aesthetics by cel'en;n,g t,� 
a passage in the Republic where Plato distinguishes between twO 
of sensations: those that leave the mind tranquil and inactive, 
those that force it to think. The first are objects of recog" irion ('This 
a finger'), for which sensation is a more or less adequate judge. 
these cases,' writes Plato, 'a man is not compelled to ask of 1h"UI!h1 
the question, "What is a finger?" for the sight never intimates to 
mind that a finger is other than a finger . . .  There is nothing 
which invites or excites intelligence. 'z Deleuze defines recognition, 
Kantian terms, as the harmonious exercise of our faculties on 
object that is supposedly identical for each of these faculties: it is 
same object that can be seen, remembered, imagined, conceived, 
so on. To be sure, each faculty (sensibility, imagination, 
understanding, reason) has its own particular given, and its own 
of acting upon the given. We recognize an object, however, when 
faculty locates its given as identical to that of another, or more p,ec'''' 
Iy, when all the faculties together relate their given and relate 
selves to 8 form of identity in the object. Recognition cons,equen" 
finds its correlate in the ideal of common sense, which is defined 
Kant, not as a special 'sense' or a particular empirical faculty, but 
the supposed identity of the subject that functions as the��:�;��� 
of our faculties, as the principle that unites them in this 
accord. These are twO poles of what Deleuze terms the 
image of thought, and which constitutes one of the main objects 
critique: the subjective identity of the self and its faculties (c
�
:::;;:= 
sense), and the objective identity of the thing to which these 
refer (recognition). Thus in Kant, the 'object in general' or 'object 
x' is the objective correlate of the 'I think' or the SUbjective unity 
consciousness.1 
But there also exists a second kind of sensation in the 
continues Plato, sensations that force us to think, that give rise 
thought. These are what Deleuze will term 'signs', for reasons we 
see below: they are no longer objects of recognition but objects ('If 
fundamental encounter. More precisely, they are no longer even 
ognizable as objects, but rather refer to sensible qualities o",
,
�::
:
�: 
that are caught up in an unlimited becoming, a perpetual n 
of contraries. A finger is never anything but a finger, but a large 
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at the same time be said to be small in relation to a third, just as 
ca:at is hard is never hard without also being soft, and so on. Recogni­
� n measures and limits these paradoxical qualities by relating them 00 
an object, but in themselves, these 'simultaneously opposed sensa­t?ons', says Plato, perplex the soul and set it in motion, they force it to �ink because they demand 'funher inquiry'. Rather than a voluntary 
and harmonious accord, the faculties here enter into an involuntary 
discord that lies at the base of Plato's model of education: sensibility 
compels the intelligence to distinguish the large and the small from the 
sensible appearances that confuse them, which in turn compels the 
memory to begin to remember the intelligible Forms.4 
It is sensations of this second type, Deleuze argues, that constitute 
the basis for any possible aesthetic. Phenomenologists like Merleau­
pontY, Straus, and Maldiney had already gone a long way toward 
freeing aesthetics from the presupposition of recognition. They argued 
that sensation, or rather 'sense experience' [/e stnrir1, must be analysed 
not only insofar as it relates sensible qualities to an identifiable object 
(the figurative moment), but insofar as each quality constitutes a field 
that stands on its own, even though it ceaselessly interferes with other 
qualities (the 'pathic' moment).� But they still remained tied to a form 
of common sense, setting up 'natural perception' as a norm, and 
locating its conditions in a sensible form or Gestalt that organizes the 
perceptive field as a function of an 'intentional consciousness' or 'lived 
body' situated within the horizon of the world. If Proust and Signs 
occupies a critical place in Deleuzc's oeuvre, it is because A la recherche 
du temps perdu, in Deleuze's reading, presents itself as a vast experi­
ment with sensations of this second type, but one freed from the 
presuppositions of both recognition and common sense. In Proust, 
these signs no longer simply indicate contrary sensible qualities, as in 
Plato, but instead testify to a much more complicated network. of 
implicated orders of signs: the frivolous signs of society life, the 
deceptive signs of love, the sensuous signs of the material world, and 
the essential signs of an, which will come to transform the others. 
Proust's narrator will discover that, when he thought he was wasting 
his time, he was in fact already embarked on an intellectual appren­
ticeship to these signs, a search for their meaning, a revelation of their 
truth. In each of these orders, the search inevitably passes through two 
eSSential moments: an 'objectivist temptation' that seeks for the 
lTleaning of the sign in the object emitting it (his lover, the madeleine), 
a
.
nd a 'subjective compensation' that seeks their meaning in a subjec­
tlYe association of ideas. But in each case, the hero discovers that the 
lrUth of signs 'transcends the states of subjectivity no less than the 
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propenies of the object': it is only in the work of art that their nature 
will be �vealed and their truth made manifest.6 
This distinction between the recognized object and the encountered 
sign, Deleuze argues, corresponds to a more general distinction be­
tween two images of thought. The 'dogmatic' or rationalist image can 
be summarized in several interrelated postulates: thought as thought 
Connally contains the truth (innateness of ideas, a priori nature 
concepts); thinking is the voluntary and natural exercise of a faculty, 
and the thinker possesses a natural love for the truth, a philia (hence 
the image of the thinker as a philo-sophos, a friend or lover of 
dam); we fall into error, we are diverted from the truth, by external 
forces that are foreign to thought and distract the mind from its 
vocation (the body, passions); therefore, all we need in order to 
truthfully is a 'method. I that will ward off error and bring us back to the 
truthful nature ofthought.1 It is against this more or less Greek image 
that Deleuze counterposes the empirical power of signs and the 
ibility of a thought 'without image': thinking is never the product of. 
voluntary disposition, but rather the result of forces that act 
thought involuntarily from the outside: we search for truth, we 
to think, only when compelled to do so, when we undergo a v';o)"oo:. 
that impels us to such a search, that wrests us from our natural 
- what calls for thought, says Heidegger, is the perpetual/act that 
are not yet thinking';' the negative of thought is not error, which is 
mere empirical fact, but more profound enemies that prevent 
genesis of thought: convention, opinion, cliches, stupidity 
finally, what leads us to truth is not 'method' but 'constraint' 
'chance': no method. can determine in advance what compels us 
think, it is rather the fortuitousness of the encounter tha,t
,
�':;
,
:'�:i 
the necessity of what it forces us to think. W"ho is it that in f� 
for the truth? It is not the friend, says Proust, exercising 
desire for truth in dialogue with others, but rathet the jealous maD, 
under the pressure of his lover's lies, and the anguish they inflict OD 
him.lo If Deleuze has always considered himself an empiricist, it is 
because. 'on the path which leads to that which is to be thought, 
everything begins with sensibility'. 1 I 
What then is a sign? In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze assigns twO 
primary characteristics to the sign. The first is that the sign riots the 
soul, renders it perplexed, as if the encountered sign were the bearer 
of a problem. The second is that the sign is something that can only be 
felt or sensed [ce qui ne peut eIre que smlll: as Francis Bacon says, it actS 
directly on the nervous system, rather than passing through the detour 
of the brain.12 It is this second characteristic that reveals most clearly 
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the difference between the encountered sign and the recognized ab­
. " the latter can not only be felt, but can also be remembered, lec . 
. agined, conceived, and so on, and thus assumes the accord of the �:uhies that Kant calls common sense. By taking the encountered 
sign as the primary element of sensation, Deleuze is pointing, object­
ively, (0 a sci.mce 0/ the sensible .t:eed from the m�1 of recognition a"d, 
subjectifJely, w a use of the foeullles /reed from the Ideal 0/ commo" sense. 
Now Kant himself had already hinted at this latter possibility in the 
Critique of Judgment where, for the first and only time, he considered a 
faculty freed from the form of common sense, namely, the faculty of 
the imagination. Up to that point, Kant had been content to create as 
many common senses as there were natural interests of reasonable 
thought (knowledge, morality, reflection), common senses which dif­
fered according to the conditions of what was to be recognized (object 
of knowledge, moral value, aesthetic effect . . .  ) .  In the en"rique of Pure 
Reason, for example, the faculties are made to enter into a harmonious 
accord in the speculative interest, in which the understanding legis­
lates over and determines the function of the other faculties ('logical 
common sense'); in the Critique of Practical Reason, the faculties enter 
into a different accord under the legislation of reason in the practical 
interest ('moral common sense'); and even in the 'Analytic of the 
Beautiful' of the Critique of Judgment, the reflective imagination is still 
said to be under the 'aesthetic common sense'" Il 
But the third Critique opened up the possibility of a new domain, a 
'disjunctive' theory of the faculties. In the 'Analytic of the Sublime', 
the faculty of the imagination is forced to confront its own limit, its 
Own maximum: faced with an immense object (the desert, a mountain, 
a pyramid) or a P9werful object (a storm at sea, an erupting volcano), 
the imagination strives to comprehend these sensations in their to­
tality, but is unable to do so. It reaches the limits of its power, and 
finds itself reduced to impotency" This failure gives rise to a pain, a 
cleavage in the subject between what can be imagined and what can be 
thought, between the imagination and reason" For what is it that 
Pushes the imagination to this limit, what forces it to attempt to unite 
the immensity of the sensible world into a whole? Kant answers that it 
is nothing other than the faculty of reason: absolute immensity or 
POwer are Ideas of reason, Ideas that can be thought but cannot be 
k.nown or imagined, and which are therefore accessible mlly to the 
faCulty of reason. The sublime thus presents us with a disunsion, a 
'discordant accord', between the demands of reason and the power of 
the imagination. But this painful admission also gives rise to a plea­
SUre: in confronting its own limit, the imagination at the same time 
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goes beyond this limit, albeit in a negative way, by representing 
itself the inaccessibility of this rational Idea. It presents to itself 
fact that the unpresemable exists, and that it exists in sensible nature,l. 
From the empirical point of view, this limit is inaccessible and 
aginable; but from the transcendental point of view, it is that 
can only be imagined, that which is accessible only to the 'imagim,ti,oQ; in its transcendental exercise, 
The lesson of the 'Analytic of the Sublime', in Deleuze's ':
;
�:':�f]'i: that it discovers this discordant accord as the condition of � 
for the harmonious accords of the faculties that Kant evoked in 
first two critiques, an accord that is not derived from 
external 'facts' (the 'fact' of knowledge. the 'fact' of morality), but ' 
engendered internally in the subject. It is this possibility of a &sjunc. 
tive use of the facu1ties, glimpsed fleetingly by Kant with regard to 
imagination, that Deleuze will extend to the entire critical proj"ct 
Rather than having all the faculties harmoniously united in an act 
recognition, each faculty is made to confront its own differential 
and is pushed to its involuntary and 'transcendental' exercise, 
exercise in which something is communicated violently from one faculty 
another. but does not fonn a common sense. Such is the use of the fa;
�
�;: 
put forward by Proust: a sensibility that apprehends and r 
signs; an intelligence, memory, and imagination that interpret 
and explicate their meaning, each according to a certain type of ,;,,, 
and a pure thought which discovers their essence as the 
reason of the sign and its meaning. What Deleuze calls a 
therefore neither a recognizable object nor even a particular q,,,]ity . 
an object, but constitutes the limit of the faculty of sensibility 
each faculty in its tum must confrOnt its own limit). As Deleuze 
it, the sign is not a sensible being, nor even a purely qualitative 
(aisthlwn), but the being afthe sensible (aisrhetton). From the 
cal point of view, the sign, in and of itself, is unsensible, not in 
contingent way, as if it were too small or too distant to be grasped 
our senses, but in an essential way, namely, from the point of view 
recognition and common sense, in which sensibility can only grasp 
can also be grasped by the other faculties. But from the trans,ce"d,,",a1 
point of view, the sign is what can only be felt or sensed, that which 
accessible o,dy to the faculty of sensibility in its transcendental 
cise. The sign, in short, points to a pure aesthetic lying at the · . 
sensibility: an immanent Idea or differential field beyond the norms 
common sense and recognition. What then is this Idea of se,,,ibilii,,­
What are these forces of the 'outside' that nonetheless give rise 
thought? 
1 .2 
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The Idea of Sensibility: Differential Relations and Differences 
in Intensity 
Already in 1790, Salomon Malmon, one of the first post-Kantians to 
lurn to Leibniz, had proposed an essential revision of Kant on re
reciSely this point. I' Leibniz argued that a conscious perception must �e related, not to a recognizable object situated in space and time, but 
to the minute and unconscious perceptions of which it is composed. I 
apprehend the noise of the sea or the munnur of a group of people, for 
instance, but not the sound of each wave or the voice of each person 
that compose them. These unconscious 'molecular' perceptions are 
�lated to conscious 'molar' perceptions, not as pans to a whole, but 
as what is ordinary to what is noticeable or remarkable: a conscious 
perception is produced when at least two of these elements enter into 
a dijfermu·al relation that detennines a singular point.16 Consider, for 
example, the colour green: yellow and blue can be perceived, but if 
their perception diminishes to the point where they become indiscer­
nible, they enter into a differential relation (db/dy = G) that deter­
mines the colour green; in tum, yellow or blue, each on its own 
account, may be detennined by the differential relation of two colours 
we cannot detect (dy/dx = V). 
Or consider the noise of the sea: at least twO minutely perceived 
waves must enter into a relation capable of detennining a third, which 
'excels' over the others and becomes conscious. These unconscious 
perceptions constitute the 'ideal genetic elements' of perception, or 
what Maimon called the 'differentials of consciousness'. It is such a 
virtual multiplicity of genetic elements, and the system of connections 
or differential relations that are established between them, that De­
leuze terms an 'Idea': the relations are actualized in diverse spatia­
temporal relationships, JUSt as the elements are actualized in diverse 
perceptions and forms. A sign, in its first aspect, is thus an 'effect' of 
these elements and relations in the Idea: a clear perception (green) is 
actualized when cenain vinual elements (yellow and blue) enter into 
a differential relation as a function of our body, and draws these 
ObScure perceptions into clarity. 11 
Deleuze suggests that Bergson, in The Creative Mind, had developed a somewhat parallel conception of the Idea, using the domain of color 
�s an example. There are two ways of detennining what 'colours' have 
In common. Either one can extract from panicular colours an abstract 
�nd general idea of color (,by removing from the red that which makes 
It red, from the blue what makes it blue, from the green what makes it 
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green'); Qr onc can make all these colours 'pass through a conve"g ... 
lens. bringing them to a single point', in which case a 'pure white 
is obtained that 'makes the differences between the shades 
out'.'8 The first case defines a generic 'concept' with a plurality 
objects. in which the relation between concept and object is one 
subsumption, and the state of difference remains exterior to the 
The second case defines a differential Idea in the Deleuzian sense. 
different colours are no longer objects under a concept, bo,t< 'm,,'i",� 
an order of mixture in co-existence and succession within the Idea; 
relation between the Idea and a given color is not one o:
.
:�
.
�:�� �: 
but one of actualization and differentiation; and the state of 
between the concept and the object is i,llenlaJized in the Idea 
White light may be a universal, if you will, but it is a cone .. . 
universal, a universal variation, and not a genus or generality. It,, ,,," 
of colour is like white light. which 'perplexes' within itself the 
elements and relations of all the colors, JUSt as the Idea of sound 
be conceived of as white noise.l<) 
This notion of the differential Idea finds its complement in 
concept of intensity: these elements and relations 8re 
actualized in an intensive magnitude. Kant himself had defmed 
principle of intensity in the 'Anticipations of Perception': we 
priori that the matter of sensations will have a degree of intensity, 
that this magnitude will change along a continuum starting from 
point where intensity = O.lO But since he defined thefonn of se,,,il)iIiI 
as extended space. Kam limited the application of intensity to 
matter of sensible intuitions that come to fill that space. But Mai."" 
like Hermann Cohen after him, argued that since space as a 
intuition is a continuum, it is the form of space itself that must 
defined a priori as intensive quantity: there is therefore an internal 
dynamic construction of space that necessarily precedes the 
entation of the whole as a form of exteriority (which implies that 
is actualized in a plurality of fonns).2l In empirical experience. to 
sure, we know only intensities or forms of energy that are 
localized and distributed in extended space: intensity is ;",e,,,,'abl 
from a process of extension that relates it to extended space 
subordinates it to the qualities that fill space. But the corresp.onolinl 
tendency is no less true, since every extensity necessarily envelops 
implicates within itself the intensity of which it is an effect. A 'sign' 
its second aspect, is an intensity produced by the asymmetry of 
differential relations, whereas a 'quality' appears when an' ����::: 
reaches a given order or magnitude and these relations are 0 
in consciousness.22 Sensations thus present a double aspect: 
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'sarily refer to a virtual and implicated order of constitutive ntee . . 
'{Terences, but they tend to cancel out those differences In the ex-dl 
ded order in which they are explicated. These intensive forces are te:er given in themselves, they cannot be grasped by the empirical oe
nses• which only grasp intensity as already recovered or mediated by :e qualitY that it creates. They can only be sensed from the point of 
.jeW of the uanscendental sensibility that apprehends it immediately 
� the encounter as the limit of sensibility itself. With the notion of m 
. , . d 'ntensity. he wnles, sensauon ceases to be representative an �eCO!Tles real'. Hence the formula: 'intensity is both the unsensible 
and that which can only be sensed'. n 
What MaImon derives from this Leibnizian argument is a transcend­
ental method of genesis rather than one of simple conditioning: a clear 
sensation emerges from obscurity by a genetic process, as it were 
through a series of filters, a series of successive integrations or syn­
theses. In the en·rique oj Pure Reason, Kant reserved the power of 
synthesis for the active 'I think', for the activity of the understanding, 
and conceived of the passive ego as a simple receptivity possessing no 
synthetic power. Because be considered the sensible to be a quality 
related to an object that sensibility intuited passively. he defined tbe 
transcendental form of space. as the condition of outer sense. by its 
geometric extension (pure intuition of objects or bodies). And if 
concepts in tum could be applied to intuitions, if a harmony was 
possible between the understanding and sensibility, it was only 
through the mysterious intermediary of the 'schematism' of the im­
agination, which alone makes the spatio-temporal relations of intui­
tion correspond to the logical relations of the concept. But the 
problem with the Kantian method of conditioning, which post-Kan­
tians such as Maimon and Cohen were quick to point out, is that it 
leaves unexplained the purely external duality between the determin­
able (space as a pure given) and the determination (the concept as 
thought), invoking 'hidden' harmonies between terms that remain 
external to one another.i• What the post-Kantians argued (as did 
Freud) is that the passive ego is itself constituted by a prodigious 
�omain of unconscious and passive syntheses that precede and condi­
liOn the activity of the 'J think'. 
Beyond Kant's external method of conditioning, MaImon proposes 
�!l i'ltemai method of genesis in which the relation between the determ­
Inable and the determination is internalized in the Idea. Rather than 
perCeption presupposing an object capable of affecting us, and the 
COnditions under which we would be capable of being affected, it is the 
r�tiprocal determination of differentials (dx/dy) that entails both the 
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complete detennination of the object as perception and the d."" ... 
inability of space-time as conditions: space-time aases to be a j'u," ,n, .. 
i" order to become the totality or nexus of differential relations in the s��:� 
and the objea ceases co be an empirical given in order to become the p 
of these relations in conscious peruption. 
'Difference is not diversity,' writes Deleuze. 'diversity is given, 
difference is that by which the given is given, by which the given 
given as diverse. '2S The error of the dogmatic image of thought is 
to deny diversity, but to tend to comprehend it only in terms 
generalities or genera. One of Deleuze's philosophic aims is to 
that the singularity and individuality of the diverse can only be 
prehended from the viewpoint of difference itself. The Idea of 
tion is constituted by two interrelated principles of difference: 
differential relations between genetic elements, and the differences 
intensity that actualize these relations. They do not indicate some 
of metaphysical reality beyond the senses; as Ideas they are po·sited _ 
order to account for sensibility, though they are not given in 
ence as such. Whereas in Kant, Ideas are unifying, totalizing 
transcendent, in Deleuzc, they are differential, genetic, and 
ent. It is the series of filters, for example, mat accounts for 
Nietzsche called the faculty of forgetting, or Bergson's claim 
perception is necessarily eliminative and subtractive: subjectivity 
(rather than simply has) an incomplete, prejudiced, and partial 
ception.26 Conversely, the significance of sensory distortions, 
those achieved in pharmacodynamic experiences or physicaJ OX" .,,; .. 
ces such as vertigo, is often to approach the intensive 
always implicated in the perception of extensity: a kind !.� �:;:�;  
of the senses" says Deleuze, that forms an integral part of 
entalism.27 Deleuze not only gives an account of 'narural 
but also experiences that are often classed as 'pathological', to 
he assigns a positivity of their own. Indeed, in his commentary 
Leibniz, Deleuze goes so far as to write that 'every perception 
hallucinatory because perception has no object', since it refers exch"ive\ 
to me psychical mechanism of differential relations among 
scious perceptions.28 This is why difference must be understood, 
as an empirical fact or even as a scientific concept, but as a ",onsce,nd: 
ental principle, as the sufficient reason of me sensible, as the being 
the sensible. 
Descartes had posited the 'clear and distinct' as the highest p�:�:! 
of common sense, a principle that would be prolonged i� 
forms in the post-Kantian tradition extending through Fichte 
Hegel: the finite mind finds its point of departure in a confused 
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b cure understanding of the world, and reason constitutes a universal o s 
gress towards the clear and distinct, 'the light which renders ��Ught possible in the common exercise of the faculties'.l' In the 
lesser known [jgu�e� of Ma!mo� a?d Cohen, Deleuze finds. a
 'minor' 
st.}(antian tradition leadmg mdlrectly to Bergson and Nietzsche: a �ar idea is in itself confused, and is confused iruofar as ir is clear. The c
onscious perception of the noise of the sea, for example, is clear but �onfused, for our perception comprehends the whole confusedly, and 
only expresses clearly certain elements and relations depending on the 
threshold of consciousness determined by our body. Conversely, the 
components of the Idea are distinct but obscure: distinct, insofar as all 
the drops of water remain distinct as the genetic elements of percep· 
tion, with their differential relations, the variations of these relations, 
and the singular points they determine; but obscure, insofar as they 
are not yet 'distinguished' or actualized in a conscious perception. 
Every sensation, in shon, is clear but confused, but is constantly 
plunged back into the distinct-obscurity from which it emerged. In 
Deleuze, the pn'ncipie of the clear and distiller is broken down inkJ two 
irreducible values that can never be reunited to constitute a nalural light. 
Deleuze's theory of sensibility, in sum, is opposed to Kant's on these 
three interrelated points: the element of sensation must be found in 
the sign, and not the qualities of a recognizable object; the sign is the 
limit-object of the faculty of sensibility, beyond the postulates of 
recognition and common sense; the Idea of sensibility is constituted 
by differential relations and differences in intensity, which give a 
genetic account of thought and constitute the conditions of real, and 
not merely possible, experience, since the conditions are never larger 
than what they condition. 
2 The Theory of Art: 'Pure Beings of Sensation' 
2.1 Philosophy and An 
:ith this rather summary sketch of Deleuze's theory of sensation in 
:nd, we are now in a position to determine its relation to the theory �. an. If Deleuze's many writings on art constitute an integral part of 
o�s p,hilosophy, it is because works of an are themselves explorations thiS transcendental realm of sensibility. The most general aim of art, aCCord' . . 
be' 
Ing to Deleuze, IS to produce a sensation, to create a 'pure o I?g of sensation', a sign.)O The work of an is, as it were, a 'machine' r apparatus' that utilizes these passive syntheses of sensation to 
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produce effects of its owo. The genetic principles of sensation are 
at the same time the principles of composition of the work of an; 
conversely, it is the structure of the work of art that reveals 
conditions. Deleuze has consequently developed his 'logic' of 
tion through a creative interaction with the various ans. In What 
Philosophy? Ddeuze defines philosophy as a practice of concepts, 
discipline that consists in the formation, invention, or creation 
concepts. 'One can very easily think without concepts,' he writes, 
as soon as there is a concept, there is truly philosophy.'ll Art is 
equally creative enterprise of thought, but onc whose object is 
create sensible aggregates rather than concepts. Great artists arc 
great thinkers, but they think in terms of sensan·ons rather than 
cepts. Painters, for example, think in terms of lines and 
musicians think in sounds, film-makers think in images, and so 
Neither discipline has any privilege over the other: to create a 
is neither more difficult nor more abstract than creating new 
audible combinations; and conversely, it is no easier to read an 
than it is to comprehend a concept. 
As a philosopher, Deleuze's aim in his studies of the arts is to 
the conceptS that correspond to these sensible aggregates. 
Bacon: Logique tk Ia stnsan"on creates a series of philosophic concep 
each of which relates to a particular aspect of Bacon's paintings. 
text is organized in a quasi-musical fashion, divided into ,,,,e,". 
sequences or series that develop local concepts as if they were 
lines, which in tum are made to enter into increasingly complex 
puntal relations, and which together form a kind of conceptual 
sition that parallels Bacon's sensible compositions. Similarly, D"le'uJI 
two-volume Cinema is 'a book of logic, a logic of the cinema' that 
out 'to isolate certain cinematographic concepts', concepts which 
proper to the cinema, but which can only be formed ph;lc"oph,k'.u� 
The same must be said for Deleuze's essays in music, literature, and 
theatre, notably those collected in Crin·que et clinique.JJ 
Modem art and modem philosophy converged on a similar 
lem: both renounced the domain of representation and instead 
the conditions of representation as their object. Paul Klee's 
phrase echoes through Deleuze's writings on the arts like a kind 
motif: not to rmder the ttisible. but to render visible.)4 T'went;eth-"."tuI 
painting aimed not at the reproduction of visible forms but the 
entation of the non-visible forces that act behind or beneath 
forms. It attempted to extract from these intensive forces 'a block 
sensations', to produce a material capable of 'capturing' these 
in a sensation. When pious critics reproached Millet for pa;n'tdll 
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ants who were carrying an offertory like a sack of potatoes, Millet peas onded by saying that what maners in the painting is not what the res�ant is carrying, but rather the exact weight common to the twO p��ec(s: his aim was to render the force of that weight visible in the o !nting. In the paintings of Cezanne, who gave this notion offorce its 
rl t full expression, mountains are made to exist uniquely through the I�:logical forces of folding they harness, landscapes through �eir �erT1lal and magnenc forces, apples through the forces of germma­
tion. Van Gogh even invented unknown forces, such as the extraordi­
nary force of a sunflower. Proust discovered that what the worlds of 
signs render visible are nothing other than the various invisible struc­
tures of time (passing time, wasted time, time regained).l5 Modem 
music has perhaps confronted this problem most directly, trying to 
develop a highly complex and elaborate material capable of making 
the nonsonorous forces of time audible, a material that could render 
duration sonorous, as in the rise of timbre in Stravinsky and Boulez, 
Edgar Varese's ionization of sound, or John Cage's experiments in 
noise such as the prepared piano. 16 
Properly speaking, there is no 'theory of art' in Deleuze: 'an' itself is 
a concept, but a purely nominal one, since there necessarily exist 
'diverse problems whose solutions are found in heterogenous arts'. 
Hermann Broch wrote that 'the sole raison d'itre of a novel is to 
discover what only the novel can discover',)' and each of the ans, and 
each work of an, confronts its own particular problems, utilizing its 
own particular material and techniques, and attempting to capture 
intensive forces of very diverse types. To say that the aim of an is not 
to represent the world, but to present a sensation (which is itself a 
composition of forces, an intensive synthesis of differential relations), 
is to say that every sensation, every work of art is singular, and that the 
conditions of sensation are at the same time the conditions for the 
production of the new. For this reason, we will limit ourselves here to 
Deleuze's examination of the oeuvre of a single anist in Francis Bacon: 
Tilt Logic 0/ Sensario'i. 
z.z The 'Figure' 
O�e of the most important concepts in Deleuze's analysis of Bacon is : at Deleuze calls, following Lyotard, the 'figural', which stands 
r 
PPosed to figuration or representation. The danger of figuration or .:\presemation in painting is that it is both illustrative and narrative: it e ates th . b" th . " Sub , e Image to an 0 Ject . at It supposedly Illustrates. thereby Ordtnating the eye to the model of recognition and losing the 
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immediacy of the sensation; and it relates the image to the 
images in the painting, thereby tempting us to discover a narrative 
between the images. As Bacon says, 'The story that is already 
told between one figure and another begins to cancel out the 
ibilities of what can be done with the paint on its own" n, �:fc:s�'': 
plays a similar role in painting as does recognition in p 
Painting has neither a story to [eU nor an object to represent: 
painting itself is a sensation, an encountered sign. But this is p,ect .. 
what constitutes the difficulty of the artistic task: 'It is a very, 
close and difficult thing,' says Bacon, 'to know why some paint 
across djrecdy onto the nervous system and other paint tells the 
in a long diatribe through the brain.'39 We return to Deleuze's 
Is: the sensation produced by the painting is something that can 
be felt or sensed. 
How does one attain a sensation in painting? Bacon's attempt 
'paint the scream' is an exemplary case in point. His aim is not to 
the visible horrors of the world before which one screams, he says. 
rather the intensive forces that produce the scream, that convulse 
body so as to create a screaming mouth: the violence of a 
spectacle must be renounced in order to attain the violence of 
sensation. Expressed as a dilemma, one might say: either he paints 
horror (the 'sensational') and does not paint the scream, be,c .. ,,, 
represents a horrible spectacle and introduces a story; or he painb 
scream directly (the 'sensation') and does not paint the visible 
because the scream is necessarily the capture of an invisible 
Bacon, like Cezanne, was so severe with his own work, and 
destroyed or renounced many of his paintings, including many 
screams, it was because they failed to anain the sensation, and 
back into the cliches of figuration and narration. Deleuze poses 
problem in this way: 'If force [intensityJ is the condition of ",.,do 
it is nonetheless not the force which is sensed, since the 
"gives" something completely different from the forces that condit! 
it.' So that the essential question of the artist becomes: 'How 
sensation be able to tum in upon itself, extend or contract 
sufficiently, in order to capture, in what is given to us, forces that 
not given, in order to make us sense these unsensible forces, 
elevate itself 10 its own com/ieions?'40 This then is the task faced 
artist: How can the material used by the artist (paint, words, 
attain this level of forces? How can it become capable of 'b,,.r'n,:' . 
sensation? 
Deleuze suggests that there are two general routes through 
modem painting escaped the cliches of figuration and attempted 
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'n the sensation directly: either by moving towards abstraction, or altai . 
else by movmg towar�s the figur.al. :ne first movement, towards 
b traction, developed In several directIOns, but was perhaps marked a 
SIWO extremes. At one pole, an abstract art like that of Mondrian or 
�andinskY' though it rejected classical figuration, still retained an 
senal of abstract forms that tried to rerme sensation, to dematerialize � to reduce it to a purely optical code. It tended towards a plane of I ;chitectonic composition in which the painting became a kind of 
:piritual being, a radiant material that was primarily thought rather 
than felt, and called the spectator to a kind of 'intellectual asceticism'. 
At the other pole, abstract �xpreuionism, like that of Jackson Pollock, 
went beyond representation nOt by painting abstract forms, but by 
dissolving all forms in a fluid and chaotic texture of lines and colours. 
It attempted to give maner its maximal extension, reversing its subor­
dination to the eye, exhibiting forces by a purely manual \ine that no 
longer oudined or delimited anything, but was spread out over the 
entire surface. 
Now in breaking with representation, both these poles of abstraction 
also broke with the ancient hylomorphic model, which conceived of 
the artistic task as the imposition of form upon maner: the abstrac­
tionists wanted to free up the form in an optical code, while the 
expressionists wanted to free up matter in a manual chaos. What the 
hylomorphic schema ignores in defining form and matter as twO 
separate terms, as Gilbert Simondon showed, is the process of con­
tinuous 'modulation' at work behind them. Matter is never a simple or 
homogenous substance capable of receiving forms, but is made up of 
intensive and energetic traits that not only make that operation 
POssible but continuously alter it (clay is more or less porous, wood is 
more or less resistant); and forms are never fixed molds, but are 
determined by the singulan"ties of the material that impose implicit 
processes of deformation and transformation (iron mths at high tem­
peratures, marble or wood split along their veins and fibres). This is 
the importance of Deleuze's notion of intensity: beyond prepared 
matter lies an energetic materiality in continuous variation, and be­�ond fixed form lie qualitative processes of deformation and trans­
Ormation in continuous development. What becomes essential in 
:
Odem an, in other words, is no longer the maner-form relation, 
lit the maten·al-fora relation. The artist takes a given energetic 
�
al�rial composed of intensive traits and singularities, and syn-
tStles its disparate elements in such a way that it can harness or 
�
apture these intensities, what Paul K1ee called 'the forces of the 
osmos' .41 
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This task is not without ambiguity, technical and otherwise. 
synthesis of the disparate elements of a material requires a co"',ln d ..... 
of consistetlcy, without which it would be impossible to distinguish 
elements that constitute the sensation. Klee, for example, said that 
order to produce a complex sensation, in order to harness the "",cc • •  
the cosmos and render them visible, one must proceed with a 
gesture that simplifies the material, selects it, limits it. All one ne"", i 
a pure and simple line, an inflexion, and he was infuriated when 
complained about the 'childishness' of his drawings,42 If one muh;pl" 
the lines, if one elaborates too rich and complex a material, the 
that one is opening oneself up to all events, to all irruptions of 
but in fact one can merely wind up producing nothing but a 
that effaces all lines. a 'sloppiness' that in fact effaces the sensation. 
It was in order to avoid this danger, as well as the danger 
formalism, that Bacon followed a second path, which finds its 
sor in Cezanne. and for which Lyotard coined the term 
Whereas 'figuration' refers to a form that is related to an object it 
supposed to represent (recognition), the figure is the form that 
connected to a sensation. and that conveys the violence of this 
tion directly to the nervous system (the sign). In Bacon's paln,;np,' 
is the human body that plays this role of the Figure: it functions as 
material support or framework that sustains a precise sensation. 
frequently begins by isolating the human body inside a contour, 
putting it inside a circle. a cube, a parallelepiped; balancing it on II 
placing it on an armchair or bed. The isolated Figure is then 
to a series of deformations through a series of manual 
making random marks, throwing the paint at the canvas, 
brushing the painting. These techniques have a double effect: 
one hand, they undo the organic and extensive unity of the body, 
instead reveal what Deleuze calls its intensive and non-organic 
on the other hand, these marks also undo the optical organization 
the painting itself, since this force is rendered in a precise 
. 
that does violence to the eye. The marks reveal the precise point 
application of the intensive force contorting the body, a cramp 
spasm twisting the figure [rom within. making the body shudder 
vibrate violently. Bacon's primary subject matter is the body 
by a plurality of forces: the violent force of a hiccup, a 
need to vomit or defecate, of copulation, the flattening force of 
Despite those who find Bacon's paintings horrific, Bacon's figures 
not tortured bodies, but ordinary bodies in ordinary situations 
discomfort, just as a person forced to sit for hours would Inevitalbl 
assume contoned postures. 
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Bacon, the Figure is the suppan for a precise sensation; without 
!11 support, the sensation would remain diffuse and ephemeral, lack­�IS 
clarity and duration. In many ways, Bacon's criticisms of expres­l�g ism had already been anticipated in Cezanne's criticisms of sion 
. . . rh 'fr ' d" f . ressionism: sensation IS not In e ee or Ismcamate play 0 
;:t and colour; it is in the body, and not in the air, whether this body . the human body (Bacon) or the body of an apple (Cezanne). 
:�ensa[jon is what is being painted,' writes Deleuze, 'what is painted 
on the canvas is the body, not insofar as it is represented as an object, 
but insofar as it is experienced as sustaining this sensation. '4) This then 
is the via media followed by Bacon: without a material framework, the 
sensation remains chaotic, but on its own the framework remains 
abstract. 
2.3 The Asymmetncal Synthesis a/the Sensible 
How does the Figure attain the 'sensation' in Bacon's painting? We 
have seen that every sensation is intensive, it implicates within itself a 
difference in quantity between unequal forces; it is thus necessarily 
synthetic, effecting a passive and asymmetrical synthesis between 
forces. 'Every sensation is already an "accumulated" or "coagulated" 
sensation.'44 A sensation cannot capture the 'forces of the cosmos', in 
other words, unless the anist is capable of effecting such syntheses in 
the material. If we left the nature of these syntheses unexplored until 
now, it is because it is in the work of art that they are most clearly 
revealed. On this score, Deleuze has analyzed three fundamental types 
of asymmetrical syntheses of the forces that Bacon effects in his 
work.4' 
'Vibration " or the Connective Synthesis: the constrnccion of a single sen'es. 
The first type of synthesis is vibration, which characterizes a simple 
sensation. Even this simple type of sensation, however, is already 
composite, since it is defined by a difference in intensiry that rises or 
falls, increases or decreases, an invisible pulsation that is more nervous 
than cerebral. Like every great paimer, Bacon will attain this vibratory �tate primarily through a complex use of colour. The Impressionists 
.f
ad already discovered the role of complememary colours in paiming: 
l one is . . 
b palOtlng grass, there must not only be a green on the canvas, U
h
t.also the complememary red, which will make the tone vibrate, and ac leve a l' . rh . t'W sun It sensation at IS produced by the 'flash' between these 
I 0 Complememary colours. Cezanne, after having reproached the 
s�ressionists for submerging the object and depicting the atmo­P ere, refused to separate the tones according to the visual spectrum 
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(the Newtonian conception of colour) and instead mixed his 
plementary colours in critical proportions (in a manner closer 
Goethe's theory of colour than Newton's), thereby attempting 
restore to the object a 'Figure' through a progressive moliuialj01l 
chromatic nuances.46 Bacon will do much the same when he 
stitutes the flesh of his Figures through a flow of po,ly"h,onlll 
colours, which are frequently dominated by blue and red, the 
of meat. 'Each broken tone indicates the immediate exercise of a 
upon the corresponding zone of the body or the head, it im.m"di." 
renders a force visible .• 47 When Deleuze writes, in the preface 
Francis Bacon, that the summit of the logic of sensation lies in 
'colouring sensation', it is because, for the painter, 
'rendered' through pure relations of colour, colour is discowred 
differential relan·on upon which everything else depends. Even a 
sensation is a relation between colours, a vibration. Jean-Luc 
is one of the great colourists of the cinema, and his statement 
Weekend - 'It's not blood, it's red' - constitutes one of the 
fonnulas of colourism.41 
'Re1Qnana', or the Conjumtiw Synwru: the convergence of (az letul) 
sen·es. The second type of syntheses. more complex. is that of 
ance. In this case, two simple Figures or sensations, rather than 
being isolated and defonned, confront each other, like two 
in a 'hand-to-hand combat', and are thereby made to resonate. 
for instance. frequently puts two bodies in a single painting, 
that are copulating or sleeping entangled, in such a way that the 
themselves are rendered indiscernible. and are made to 
together in a single 'matter of fact', in order to make som"th,ing "PI'! 
that is irreducible to the two: this sensation, this Figure. 
argues that the great example of resonance in literature can be 
in Proust's involuntary memory. in which two sensations (f,,, ins ... 
the present flavour of the madeleine and the past memory of 
bray) are coupled together in order to make a pure Figure appear 
internalizes the difference between the two sensations: C�::�;:;,;:: 
self. What is important in resonance is that (at least) twO 
are coupled together. and from them is extracted an ineffable 
(Proust) or 'figure' (Bacon) that is irreducible to either of 
something new is produced.49 
'Forced Movement', or Disjunctive Synthens: the affirmation ofdi'h�" 
sen·es. Finally, there is the most complicated of these syntheses, 
Deleuze calls a forced movement. This is no longer a coupling 
sensations, but on the contrary their distention or deviation. In 
this appears most clearly in the triptychs, in which the Figures. 
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being isolated or coupled, are set apan from each other in than 
ale panels, How can the separated Figures oCthe triptychs be said 
sep
ar
esent a single 'matter of fact'? It is because in them the separated t� prres achieve such an extraordinary amplitude between them that flst;imitS of sensation are broken: sensation is no longer dependent the 
n a Figure per se, but rather the inlensjf)e rhythm 0/ force itself ;::mes the Figure of the triptych. The Figures loosen their grip on each 
[�er, and are no longer united by anything but the distance that °
eparates them, and the light, the air, or the void which insens itself �etween them like a wedge. It is because of this amplitude that 
Deieuze assigns a privileged place to the triptychs in Bacon's work. �o 
Vibration, resonance, and forced movement are the concepts 
Deleuze creates to describe the three types of syntheses that Bacon 
utilizes to 'paint the sensation'. In general, these constirute the intens­
ive conditions of sensation, the three 'varieties' of compositions of 
sensation, the three modalities of a 'being of sensation'. To be sure, 
each of these syntheses co-exist in Bacon's paintings, which are con­
crete assemblages of differences, mixed states. In the individual paint­
ings, for example, the large fields of uniform colour already effect a 
distancing function similar to that of the triptychs (disjunction), but 
are likewise themselves composed of subtle variations of intensity or 
saturation (connection) ; and vibrations in turn are already effects of 
resonance, since they couple together diverse levels of sensation (con­
junction).51 The important point is that the artist utilizes these intens­
ive syntheses in order to produce 'a pure being of sensation'; the work 
of art is a functional 'machine' that produces effects of vibration, 
resonance, and forced movement. The question that must therefore be 
posed to a work of art, argues Deleuze, is not 'What does it mean?' 
(interpretation) but rather 'How does it work? (experimentation): 
':'Vhat are the connections, what are the disjunctions, the conjunc­
bons, what use is made of the syntheses?'52 
�e sensation itself, however, must not be confused with the materi­
al In which these syntheses are effected. Art is composition, but the technical composition of the material is not the same as the aesthetic composition of the sensation. It is true that in fact (quid faca'?) the sensation I I '  . ch ' asts no onger than ItS suppOrt or matenals (stone, canvas, ti e�lcal colour, etc.), But in principle at least (quidjun's?), the sensa­
lo
on IS of a different order than the material, and exists in itself for as 
us�t as the material lasts. Oil painting, Deleuze suggests, provides a In I example of this distinction, since it can be approached in two 
pr:�ners. In a first case, the sensation is realized in Ihe maten'al and Jetted Onto it: an outline is sketched on a white background, and 
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colour, light and shade are added afterwards. In a second cast, 
modem art has increasingly tended to adopt, it is the materia} 
passes into sensation: rather than beginning with a sketch, the 
gradually 'thickens' the background, adding colour alongside 
piling up or folding the material in such a way that the ",:hit"""" 
the sensation emerges from the medium itself, and the 
becomes indiscernible from the sensation. In either cast, how.v .. 
is matter itself that becomes expressive, so that one can say of 
sensation itself that it is metallic, crystalline, stony, colouring, 
on. The material constitutes the de facto condition of the 'eo,sa" 
and insofar as this condition is satisfied, even if only for a few 
(as in Tinguely's self-destructing creations), it gives the com"o'lIl4I 
created sensations the power to exist and to be preserved in 
itself: a 'monument'.H 
The work of an is thus a synthetic unity. But what is the 
this unity, if the heterogenous elements it synthesizes have no 
relation to each other than sheer difference? The elements 
together by the work of an cannot be said to be fragments of . 
unity or shattered totality, nor can the pans be said to 
prefigure the unity of the work through the course of a 
dialectical development or an organic evolution. Rather than 
ing as their totalizing or unifying principle, the work of art can 
understood as the effecl of the multiplicity of the disconnected 
(The work of art produces a unity, but this product is simply a 
.that is added alongside the other parts. The artwork nei', h.nmifi •• 
totalizes these parts, but it has an effect on them because. �it::,�:::� 
syntheses between elements that in themselves do not c 
and that retain all their difference in their own dimensions. An 
lishes 'transversals' between the elements of multiplicities, but 
out ever reducing their difference to a form of identity or, ��;�: 
the multiplicity into a totality. The work of an, as a c 
sensations, is not a unification or totalization of differences, but 
the production 0/ a new dif!ere'lCe, and 'style' in art always begins 
the synthetic relations between heterogenous differences.'4 
Deleuze's aesthetic theory is not a theory of reception, an 
the spectator's judgments of a work of an, but a theory 
written from the point of view of creation. Its guiding 
What are the conditions for the production of the new? In light 
question, our aim �as been to show how Deleuze's philosophY 
'difference' overcomes the duality with which aesthetics has 
encumbered since Kant. On the one hand, in breaking with the 
of recognition and common sense, and the image of thought 
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. h they 3rt derived, Deleuze locates the element of sensation, not �hlC 
recOgnizable object but in an encountered sign. The sign con­In, a 
tes the limit-object of sensibility, an intensive product of diff'eren­S�I�U elations: it is intensity, and not the a priori forms of space and 
�a : that constitutes the condition of real, and not merely possible, om 
erieDee. On the other hand, these genetic principles of sensibility cXP . tb . .  I f · ·  f tb k f at the same time e pnnclp es 0 composltton 0 e war 0 an. �e artist uses th�se. intensive synthes�s to produce a bloc of sensa­
. 
os and in tum It IS the work of art Itself that reveals the nature of �oese' syntheses. In this way, Deleuze's logic of sensation reunites the 
twO dissociated halves of aesthetics: the theory of forms of experience 
(as 'the being of the sensible') and the work of art as experimentation 
(as 'a pure being of sensation'). 'The work of art quits the domain of 
representation in order to become "experience", transcendental em­
piricism or the science of the sensible.·n If Deleuze's various writings 
on art are, as he says, 'philosophy, nothing but philosophy', it is 
precisely because they constitute explorations of, and experimenta­
Dons within, this transcendental domain of sensibility. 
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n and Graham Burchell, New York: Columbia University Pr�s, 1 994, 
50 144--50 (,opinion is a thought closely molded on the form of recogni­���'); on cliches, particularly as they pose .a problem for the artist, see 
The Movement-Image, pp. 208-9, and Francu Bacon, pp. 57-63. 
According to Proust, jealousy is not a disease of love but its truth, its 
10 finality, and all love is 'a dispute over evidence', 'a delirium of signs' 
" 
(Proust and Signs, PP: .1 17, 122). . .  . . 
Dif!ere,,,e and Repetlnon, p. 144; sec also Expremomsm m Philosophy: 
Spi,/O:!(l, trans. Manin Joughin, New York: Zone Books, 1 990, p. 149: 
'One is always struck by the diverse inspirations of empiricists and 
rationaliSts. One group is surprised by what fails to surprise the others. If 
we listen to the rationalists, truth and freedom are, above all, rightS; they 
wonder how we can lose our rights, fall into error or lose our libeny . . .  
From an empiricist viewpoint, everything is invened: what is surprising is 
that men sometimes manage to understand truth, sometimes manage to 
understand one other, sometimes manage to free themselves from what 
fetters them.' 
12 Francis Bacon, The Brutality of Fact: Inlerows with David Sylvester, 
London: Thames and Hudson, 1975, p. 18. 
Il Kant presents this theory of common sense in the Critique of Judgment, 
SJ8-22, §40. 
14 Sec ibid., S29, General Remark. Kant's 'Analytic of the Sublime' lies at the 
centre of Jean-Franc;ois Lyotard's conception of'posnnodc:m' art, which he 
defines as that which prumu the unpru.muWk in his essay 'Answering the 
Question: What is Posnnodemism?,' in TM Posrmodem Condition: A Report 
on Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi, Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1984, pp. 71-82. There is a profound 
diffettnce between Deleuzc and Lyotard, despite numerow lines of conver­
gence between their respective theori� of an: Delcuzc's theory is derived 
from an analysis of sensibility (intensity), whereas Lyowd's is derived from 
the faculty of the imagination (the sublime). Lyotard sometimes speaks of 
the 'imagination or sensibility' in the same sentence (e.g., pp. 80, 81), but 
without ever taking the funher step of extracting the limit-element of sensi­
bility, which is precisely not that of the imagination. The difference would 
scem 10 bear on the nature of the Ideas appealed 10 each instance: transcend­
ent in the case: of the imagination, immanent in the case of sensibility. For 
Lyolard's analysis of the sublime, sec his imponant commentari� in Ln£ons 
on the Analytic oftlu SubJimt, trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 1994. 15 Salomon Maimon, Venuch Qber dit rrans%mdalllal phiJosophit, Berlin: 
Christian Vos, 1 790. For commentary, see above all Manial Gueroult, 
La phi/osophit transctndentale de Salo"um Marmon, Paris: Alean, 1929. �sp: PP. 55ff and 76ff; Sylvain Zac, Salomon Marmon: Critiqut de Kant, 
C
ans: C::erf, 1988, esp. ch. 6; and Frederick Beiser, The Fate of Reason, 
ambndge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987, pp. 295-303. "qo;:",. 
o tR'!-. 
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16 Note on the differenti41 relation, The nature of the differen"'
;
;:';I
;
�:�
;
�� 
be made clear by comparing three types of relation d 
mathematics. A fiTSt type is e1ilablished between elements that 
selves independent or autonomous, such as 3 + 2 or 2/3. The 
are real. and these relations themselves must be said to be real. 
ty�. for example Xl + Y. - RI = 0 (the algebraic equation for the 
established between terms whose value is unspecified, but which 
thelcss must in tach CIISt have a determined value. Such relations 
called imaginary. But the third type of relation is established 
elements that themsdves have no determined value, but that n,',,,,,,, 
arc: determined reciprocally in the relation: thus ydy + xcix = 0 
universal of the circumference or the corresponding 
dy/dx =-x/y (the expression of a curve and its trigonometric 
These are differential relations. The elements of these relations 
detennined, being neither real nor imaginary: dy is completely 
mined in relation to y, dx is completely undetennined in relation 
they are perfectly determinable in the differential relation: the 
themselves do not exist apan from the differential relation into 
they enter and by which they are reciprocally detennined. This 
lial relation, in turn, determines a singular point, and it is the set 
poinls that detennines the topological space of a given ."�, .  
triangle, for example, has three singular points, while curves and 
are derived from more complex distributions). Sec Deleuze, 'A 
reconniit-on la structuralisme?', in Fran�ois ChAlelel, ed., Hisroi,. 
philosophie rome 8: Le XXe siicle, Paris: Hachene, 1972, �P�;. �!�� 
Fold: Leibniz and the &roque. uans. Tom Conley, 
London: University of Minnesota Press, 1993, p. 88; 
Repetititm, pp. 172-5. 
1 7  For Deleuze's interpretation of Lcibniz's theory of perception, 
Fold: Leibni:: and the Baroque, ch. 7, 'Perception in the 
from which the above examples are taken. For Lcibniz's 
sec Dijcourse on Metaphysiu, 533; 
jal Mind, 514; Monadology, 520-25; Principla 0/ Nature and 
and the New Euays, chapter I .  
1 8  Henri Bergson, The Creatiw Mind, trans. Mabelle L. Andison, 
New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1965, p. 225. �:�;:.:'t:.:�;': example in 'La Conception de la difference chez Bergson', 
niennes 4, 1956, pp. 77- 1 1 2 ,  and draws out its consequences in TIu 
0/ Sellse, p. 136: 'To have a colour is not more general than to be 
because it is only this colour, and this green which is this nuance, 
related to the individual subject. This rose is not red without 
redness of this rose. '  Deleuze is closer to Goethe than Newton. 
theory of colour has similarly been retrieved in cenain ,o,"<oml:'!'! 
scientific theories: redness is no longer perceived as a band-width 
but as a singularity within a chaotic universe, whose boundaries 
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alwayS easy [0 describe; see James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science, 
London: Sphere, 1988, pp. 164-6. 
Likewise, o�e co.uld s�eak of a white society or a wh!te langu�ge, which 19 nlains in Its vtrtuahty all the phonemes and relations destmed to be C�tualized in the diverse languages and in the remarkable parts of a same �anguage; see DifferellCe and Repetition, pp. 20}-7. For a fuller analysis of 
musical form along these lines, see Jean-Fran�ois Lyotard, 'Several Silen­
ces', in Dnltworks, ed. Roger McKeon, New York: Semiotext[e), 1984, 
pp. 99-110. . . 
20 Immanuel Kant, CMtlque 0/ Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, London: Macmillan, 1929, A1691B21 1 : 'Every sensation has a degree, 
that is, an intensive magnitude which can always be diminished (to the 
point where the intensity = OJ . . .  Every colour, as for instance red, has a 
degree which, however small it may be, is never the smallest; and so with 
heat, the moment of gravity, etc.' 
21 Hermann Cohen, Kants Theone der Erjahnmg, 2nd edn, Berlin: Dumm­
ler, 1885, p. 428: 'Space and time itself, the sensible conditions of the 
unity of consciousness, insofar as they represent quanta continua, are 
constiruted as continua by the realily oj interuive magnitude as the condi­
tion of thought. Intensive magnitude consequently appears immediately 
as the prior condition of the extensive . . .  Such was the necessity that led 
to the infinitely small, positing something that became a unity not in 
relation to One but in relation to Zero' (p. 428). See Jules Vuillemin's 
commentaries in L 'Heritage kanrien et la ri'Volution copernicienne: Fichu, 
Cohen, Heidegger, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954, pp. 
132-207. 
22 Difference and Repetition, p. 20: 'By "sign" we mean what happens within 
such a [differential] system, what flashes across the intervals when a 
communication takes place between disparates. The sign is indeed an 
effect. but an effect with two aspects: in one of these it expresses, qua 
Sign, the productive dissymmetry; in the other it tends to cancel it.' 
23 Frallcis Bacon, p. 34; Difference ond Reperirion, p. 230. 
24 Kant himself admitted that this schematizing power of the imagination 
was 'blind', 'an art concealed in the depths of the human soul', an activity 
'nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover' (Cririque oj Pure 
Reason, A78fBJ03, AI41/BI80-181). It is for this reason that Heidegger 
tOok the imagination as the focal point of his reading of Kant, in KiJnr and 
the Problem 0/ Metaphysics, trans. James S. Churchill, Bloomington: India-
25 na University Press, 1962. 
26 �Wert1/ce and Repetition, p. 222. 
IC\Zsche, Genealogy 0/ Morals, Essay II, §l, pp. 57-8: 'What we experi­
�nce and absorb enters our consciousness as little while we arc digesting It 
. • .  as does the thousandfold process involved in physical nourishment . . .  so that it will be immediately obvious how there could be no happi­ness, no cheerfulness, no hope, no pride, no preSel'll, without forgetful-
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ness.' Berpon, Matter and Memo!)" trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. 
Scan Palmer, New York: Zone Books, 1988, pp. 35-6: we never perceive 
objects per se, but rather objects minus those aspects that do not intereat 
us as a function of our needs. 
27 Difference and Repetirion, p. 237. In the chapter on 'The Perception­
Image' in The Mowment-Imap, Deleuze argues that, if the cinema goes 
beyond normal perception, it is in the sense that it reaches this genetic 
element of a1l possible per�ption: 'In the "'kino-eye", Ven.ov was aimine 
to attain or regain the system of universal variation in itself,' to 'reaeb 
"another" perception, which is also the genetic element of all perception' 
(pp. 80-6). 
28 The Fold: Ltibni:: and the Baroque, p. 93. 
29 Difference and Repetition, p. 213. Martial Gueroult discusses the role thia 
notion played in post-Kantian philosophy in L'Ewlution et la su crure . 
la Doctrint de la Science chez Fichu, Paris: I.es Belles I.ettres, 1930, vol. 
pp. 14ff ('clear and distinct understanding was posited as the fruit of 
continuous development whose point of departure was the ':::i'��� 
understanding, the sole fonn under which the totality of the 
could be given originally in the finite mind'). 
30 W'hat is Philosophy', p. 167. 
31 Deleuze, NegotUltions 1972-1990, trans. Martin Joughin, New York: 
umbia, 1995; d. The Timt-Image, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and 
Galeta, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989, p. 280: 
theory of cinema does not bear on the cinema, but on the concepts 
cinema, which are no less practical, effective, or existent than ,h "in"m� 
itself.' 
32 Negotiations 1971-/990, p. 47. The Mowmtnt-lmage, p. ix. 
33 Deleuze, Critique et clinique, Paris: Minuit, 1993. 
34 Paul Klee, 'SchOpferische Konfession', in Das Bildnersiche Dtnken, 
1964, p. 76, as quoted in Francis Bacon, p. 39 and A Thousand PI'.", .... 
p. 342; sec also Maldiney's commentary in Parole Regard Es/Xlce, 
1 4 3-6. Lyotard's similar formula - 'not to represent, but to present 
unpresentable' - is discussed in 'The Sublime and the Avant-Garde', . 
The Inhuman: Reflections on Time, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Universitf 
Press, 1988, pp. 89-107. 
35 See ProUSl and Signs, pp. 17-18: 'Time, which usually is not visible, seeD 
out bodies in order to become visible, seizing bodies wherever it en-­
counters them so as to cast its magic lantern,' modifying this feature 
someone we knew long ago, elongating, blurring, or crushing that one. 
Deleuze distinguishes four structures of time in Proust: lost time is both 
'passing time' and 'waned time'; time regained is both a 'time recovered' 
at the heart of time lost, and an 'original time' that is affirmed in an. 
36 For these examples, see A Thousand pta/taws, p. 343; Francis Bac0I1, p. 39. 
37 Quoted in Milan Kundera, The Art of Ihe N(1'IJti, trans. Linda Asher, New' 
York: Grove Press, 1988, pp. 5, 36. 
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38 Bacon, The Bmralil)' 0/ Fact, p. 23. 
39 Ibid., p. 18. 
40 Francis Bacon, pp. 39-40. 
41 Gilbert Simondon, L'individu et so genise physiw-biologique, Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1964; Deleuze was heavily influenced by 
Simondon's text. 
42 Paul Klee, On Modern An, trans. Paul Findlay, intro. Herbert Reed, 
London: Faber, 1966, p. 53: 'Had I wished to present man "as he is", 
then 1 should have had to use such a bewildering confusion of lines that 
pure elememary representation would have been out of the question. The 
result would have been vagueness beyond recognition.' 
43 Fra/zcis Bacon, p. 27. 
44 Francis Bacon, pp. 28-9; cf. Difference and ReJHlition, p. 234. 
45 The primary texts on these sensible syntheses in art are: Frana! Bacon, 
pp. 48-9; What is Philosophy?, pp. 167-8; and Proust and Signs, pp. 
131-42. 
46 In Newton, for example, the 'optical' grey is obtained through a combi­
nation of black and white, whereas in Goethe the 'haptic' grey is obtained 
through a combination of green and red. See Goethe, Color Theory, ed. 
Rupprecht Manhaei, New York: Van Nostrand, 1971. On Cezanne's 
relation to the Impressionists with regard to colour, see Maurice Mer­
leau-Ponty, 'Cezanne's DOUbt,' in The Essential WritingJ, ed. Alden L. 
Fischer, New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1969, p. 236. 
47 Francis Bacon, p. 96. 
48 The Movement-Image, p. 1 18. On these relations of colour, see Deleuze's 
discussion in Francis Bacon, ch. 15, 'La traversee de Bacon', pp. 93-7. 
49 On the role of resonance in involuntary memory, see Proust and Signs, ch. 
5, 'The Secondary Role of Memory', pp. 5 1-64 Goyce's 'epiphanies', 
Deleuze suggests, can be analysed in the same manner). On coupling in 
Bacon, see Francis Bacon, ch. 9, 'Couples et triptyques,' pp. 45-9. 
50 On 'forced movemem' in Bacon, see Francis Bacon, ch. 10, 'Qu'est-ce 
qu'un triptyque?', pp. 51-6. The question concerning the conditions 
under which disjunction can be a fonn of synthesis (and not an analytic 
procedure that excludes the predicates of a thing by vinue of the identity 
of its concept) is one of the decisive questions posed by a philosophy of 
difference. though it lies beyond the scope of this paper. For Deleuze's 
discussions of the problem. see 'La synthese disjonctive' (with Guartari), 
in L'Arr: 43 1970, pp. 54--62 and The Logic 0/ Sensarion, pp. 172-6, 
'1 
294--7. 
In Whal is Philosophy? (p. 168), Deleuze suggests that, of all the arts, it is 
perhaps sculpture that presents these three syntheses in an almost pure 
state: first, there are the sensations of stone, marble, or metal, which 
vibrate according 10 strong and weak beats; second, there are the pro­
tuberances and cavities in the material, which establish powerful combats 
that interlock and resonate with each other; and finally, there is the set-up 
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of th� sculptu�. with larg� empty spaces between groups, or even within 
a single group, in which one no longer knows if it is the light or air that 
sculpts or is sculpted. 
52 Deleuze and Guanari, Anti-Oedipus, trans. Roben Hurley, Mark Seem 
and Helen R Lane. New York: Viking, 1977, p. 109. 
53 On the relarion of the sensarion to the material, see What is PhilosofJhy�. 
ch. 7, passim, esp. pp. 191-7. 
54 See Anti-Otdipws, p. 42: the work or art 'is a whole o/its constituent pans 
but does not totalize them; it is a unity of its particular pans but it does 
not unify them; rather, it is added to them 85 a new part fabricated 
separately'. On the concept of 'transvenality' fonnulated by Guanari, see 
Anust and Signs, pp. 149-50 (and p. 157, n. 106). 
55 Difftrtnu and Repetition, p. 56. 
